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A correspondent who states that he wrote at the request of some
clients to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to inquire whether

under the Excise Law any stamp duty was payable upon deeds oi
marriage settlement, of release, and other conveyances for a nominal consideration, requests us to publish the following reply, which
has been sent him.
OFFICIAL.
TREASUnY DEPARTMENT,
OFFION OF INTERNAL

RxVENUE,

Washington, Oct. - 1863.
Sm :-Your letter of September 5th has been received. In reply thereto I have
the honor to state that any deed whereby real estate is conveyed is subject to
stamp duty appropriate to the value of the estate conveyed; see "Conveyance,"
in the enclosed schedule.
The word "sold" in the Excise Law, as used in connection with stamp duties on
conveyance, is used in the same sense as when incorporated in the phraseology
of a deed; "bargained, sold," &c.
Wherever the owners of the land partitioned, are "joint tenants," the consideration of the interest conveyed, is the value of the right relinquished; the one tenant virtually exchanges his interest in the land, for the interest which the other
relinquishes in the rest of the land; each joint tenant being seized " pe me et per
tu," (sic,) the partition is not a mere ascertainment of the several parts to which
each is entitled, but is a substantive grant by which an estate in law passes, and
the value of the land, is the measure of the stamp duty required.
Where the parties are "tenants in common," they hold by several and distinct
titles, and are each seised of a-distinct part of the lands; the partition is but a
means of ascertaining their rights and severalty, aud the deed is not a grant,
therefore no stamp is required.
Very respectfully,

Deptey Commutsioner.

Our correspondent adds the following observations, which we beg
not to be understood as adopting for our own :
A novel and interesting distinction is taken in this letter between
joint tenants and tenants in common. The steady way in which

legal principles are emancipated, in the United States, from the
cramped influence of the common law, has been a subject of national
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pride. We, as an eminent Western counsel once observed, "don't
want English common law. We want the best law they have got.
We want Queen Victoria's law." Indeed, we are capable of improving even on that.
" In England, for instance, the real difference between
joint tenan cy and tenancy in common. is supposed to consist, for the other
incidents are butconsequences, in unity of seisin. Ioint tenants cannot, therefore, make partition by feoffment, for livery of seisin is
impossible; but, for the same reason, they can, as tenants in common cannot, make partition by mutual releases. There is not, under
"Queen Victoria's law," any "substantive grant" in such a case;
nor does any distinct " estate in the land" pass, for each has already
the whole in himself. In its conveyancing aspect, the transaction
is the simplest possible; not the grant, but the relinquishment of a
right. In this country, I may add, where survivorship is generally
abolished, this distinction about unity of seisin is in fact all that
remains, and of course is purely technical.
On the other h~nd in England tenants in common have a distinct seisin. It is true that there a tenant is not supposed to own
"any distinct part of the lands," as we are agreeably surprised to
learn that he does here. If he did, partition by deed would hardly
be required; setting out fences, or stakes, would be all the conveyancing needed to ascertain his "rights and severalty." - But, except
in their "promiscuous possession," as Blackstone calls it, tenants
in common are as strangers towards each other. Their reciprocal
conveyances on a partition must be by grant and not by release. In
form and fact they are the same as those required for the transfer
of estates in severalty.
If, then, we had still remained under the common law, the deputy
commissioner would have been obliged, if he went on mere technical
grounds, to decide just the other way, and exact the payment of
stamp duty on partition deeds of tenants in common, and not
on those of joint tenants. He might, however, under some base
pretext of common sense, escape by alleging that for the purposes
of the stamp act, there is not a particle of difference between a joint
tenant and a tenant in common; that each is the owner of an un-
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divided interest in land, however technically described, and that
the separation of that interest, when effected by deed of partition,
is not in any sense a "sale" to a "purchaser" within the meaning
of the law.
I may also be allowed in this connection to express my pleasure
at finding that we are able to throw off the etymologies as well as
the rules of the English law. The familiar words used in describing a joint tenancy, per my et per tout, used to be of Norman French
descent, and to signify "by nothing, and by all," that is nothing
separately, everything jointly. They are now for the first time
proved to be Latin, perhaps of the Lower Empire when a good deal
of attention was paid to the subject of taxation. Per me et per tu,
which means "th r ough me and through thee," or would, if it were
te instead of -tu, a trifling grammatical error, easily explained by
the looseness of style of the old monkish writers. How striking
the metaphor, and how expressive of the intimate and penetrative,
if I may use the word, character of joint tenancy ! It suggests
the idea of the several owners being transfixed and strung together
like fish on a legal twig. It throws us back to those old picturesque
days when clods of earth and keys of doors were handed over
to betoken seisin; and we may imagine two tenants embracing on
their joint heritage, and as pledge and confirmation of the sweet
unities of time title and possession, murmuring to each other the
mystic rhyme,
"Through me,
Through thee."

I remember, indeed, to have seen, in the works of Mr. Palgrave
and M. Michelet, just such "versicles" quoted as being the natural
and popular expression, in early ages, of all legal truths.
In conclusion 1 must admit that while I have entire confidence
in the progressive nature of legal science, there is one point in the
letter which I do not exactly understand, and though I know I
ought to take it on faith, I shall be glad if one of your more advanced readers will explain it to me. The deputy commissioner
states that "any deed whereby real estate is conveyed is subject to
stamp duty," because "the word ' sold' in the Excise Law is used in

LEGAL MISCELLANY.

119

the same sense as when incorporated in the phraseology of a deed,
'bargained, sold,'" &c. But I don't see how this helps him to his
conclusion or solves my difficulty. These words, "bargain and
sell," were introduced into certain kinds of conveyances in England, shortly after the Statute of Uses, to evade its operation.
They alleged a real or pretended sale of the property to be transferred, which, in the view of a Court of Equity, made the vendor
seised to the use of the vendee, and so, by force of the statute, the
latter acquired at once the legal title, without livery of seisin. In
deeds they are and always have been used "in the same sense" in
which they would be used in ordinary speech, and no other ; only in
some cases a sale is simulated to avoid the inconvenience and publicity.
of a feoffment. Still, whether a sham or a reality, a sale, in the
common sense of the word, is asserted ; and if the consideration of
that sale be one dollar, as in marriage settlements-releases and the
like, it is below the minimum expressly fixed by the stamp law, and
therefore not subject to stamp duty. !f, however, the deputy commissioner means, as I have a sort of hazy idea he does, that as
marriage settlements, and so forth, are usually by deeds of "bar"gain and sale," they are actually sales, and as no real pecuniary
consideration -is therein expressed, the value of the property must
be taken ; then here again I can only helplessly appeal to your
advanced contributors. I know marriage settlements, and so forth,
are not sales, nor anything of the kind. If it is only the introduction" of three technical and now insignificant words into a deed,
which, by a legal metamorphosis, converts them into such, I apprehend the most demoralising evasions of the law. The lease and release used in England (except to the amount of the stamp on the
lease), steers quite clear of such an interpretation of the stamp act,
and in point of fact, as under the laws of most of the United States,
mere recording has the same effect as livery of seisin, we may, by
giving up the expensive luxury of the phrase "bargain and sell,"
escape altogether. Of course it would be very wrong to do this;
but unfortunately judges whose minds have been vitiated by protracted study of law, might not see it in the same light. I have no
confidence in the result, until the progressive doctrine is firmly

